Improving Safety at Sea and Ports by developing standards for Maritime English

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Abstract - Recent research has demonstrated that while the reduction of accidents has been substantial over the last 10 years, the number of accidents caused due to human error is actually increasing.

The accidents are often sub-divided by those caused by human error, poor design or equipment failure. However, the number of accidents due to human error is shown to be by far greater than those caused by poor design or equipment failure. Furthermore, the accidents due to communication and linguistic mistakes are reported to be one of the main causes of accidents and incidents at sea.

This paper concerns aspects relating to human error, particularly those aspects originating from ‘communication issues’. The focus is on how seafarers are taught to communicate using ‘the language of the sea’ which is English. Communication problems is considered on a macro basis and is evaluated by taking into consideration its underlying reasons such as cultural problems, linguistic problems, fatigue, psychological problems – such as stress, pressure, etc. - , misapplication of rules, organisational problems, teaching and training-of-trainer practices, etc. It is interesting that, at a recent IMO Maritime Safety Committee competence in Maritime English was once again highlighted to be a major issue. (IMO MSC, 2006)

The work reported here shows how communication failures can be addressed through removal of existing deficiencies of Maritime English Language training practices and by encouraging improvement in assessment practice through, for instance, the developments of standards for Maritime English. The strength of the programme of research reported here is that it has taken into consideration the language skills as well as the competency levels in each skill needed for each type and rank of seafarer.

Special references are made to the work of EU funded Leonardo MarTEL Project partnership in developing standards and supporting study units for Maritime English.

Keyword: Maritime English, Safety at Sea, Communication Failures, Accidents at sea

INTRODUCTION

According to International Maritime Organisations (IMO) (2005) 80% of accidents at sea are caused by human error, and one of the main causes of these accidents and incidents, some involving loss of life, large number of injuries and extensive financial loss, are due to poor standards of Maritime English (Ziarati, 2006). At a recent IMO Maritime Safety Committee (MSC IMO, 2006) this issue was highlighted and reinforced by the papers presented by Turkish and English delegations.

The research reported here is an attempt to address major problems relating to competency in Maritime English for the well-being of seafarers and those working in the shipping and maritime industry including ports; and is concerned with the establishment of standards of Maritime English for all classes of seafarers and for those working at ports with the intention of
obtaining recognition for their language competence from major chartered professional bodies and appropriate licensing authorities.

The reason why all the problems mentioned above arise is because there are no International or European standards for Maritime English. The intention here is to report on the work of a transnational partnership working to establish a set of standards by transfer of innovation from existing maritime English model courses and English Language standards, such as IELTS, TOEFL, benchmarking them in terms of testing methods rather than their contents. There is a fundamental difference between the intended standards and systems such as IELTS and TOEFL; in that, the proposed standards will target each and every class of seafarers. The tests for these standards will focus on all skills with less emphasis on grammar. All tests for Officer and Senior Officer Levels are expected to have different weights on different skills at Elementary, Intermediate and Advanced levels and different proficiency requirements at different ranks or for different duties. For example, a Chief Engineer should be competent on comprehension (specially reading) and writing but a more moderate level of speaking may be tolerated (Ulkuatam and Sernikli, 2008).

Setting aside the positive tangible outcomes of the proposed standards there are a number of intangible benefits, for instance, industry will be able to use the standards to assess the level of Maritime English of its personnel and that individuals are able to self-assess themselves and if need be to use the self-learning platform being developed. The impact of the project is expected to be substantial as it responds to a European and international acknowledged problem.

Birth of MarTEL

Recent report by the UK's Maritime Coastguard Agency (MCA) to IMO MSC 2006 identifies English language competency of seafarers as one of the major problems which has contributed to many accidents and incidents at sea. Although, the number of accidents is decreasing, accidents due to human errors have increased (see Figures 1 and 2) and in fact the trend indicates an increase in the number of accidents due to human error. Some of these problems are due to language communication problems among the crew, often leading to actions responsible for incidents and accidents (Ziarati, 2006).

**Shipping Accidents from 1991 to 2000**

![Graph showing shipping accidents from 1991 to 2000](Transportation Safety Board of Canada, 2001)

**Figure 1.** Source: ABS Project (2004)
Many shipping companies or ship owners do not accept responsibility after an accident or incident if language issues are highlighted. The reasons are generally obvious; however, this paper makes an attempt to discuss the reason for such behaviour to search for real cause/ reason for accidents and incidents when language competency or linguistic problems are identified as the main or a contributory factor.

MarTEL project (2007-09) makes an attempt to overcome the problem of not having international or European standards for Maritime English. As stated earlier, the project is an attempt to establish a set of standards by transfer of innovation from existing English language standards and maritime English model courses such as International Maritime Organisation’s (IMO) SMCP (Standard Maritime Communication Phrases, 2001). Review of the arguments from the recent IMO meetings (IMO MSC, 2006) considering MSC 82/15/2 and MSC 82/15/3 had identified that ‘there is a compelling need to promote a high level of working maritime English language skills’. Several EU member states have invited STW sub-committee to consider how the requirements in the STCW-Code can be strengthened in this connection. It was noted that deficiencies in maritime English causes accidents and therefore needs to be seriously taught in the basic and the main training of all Chapters of the STCW Code of practice. It is interesting to note that both of the above issues were also the findings of an IMarEST paper and report (Ziarati, 2006; Ziarati and Ziarati, 2007).

MarTEL therefore is a maritime language competency assessment project for the language certification with the main aim of developing a series of maritime English language standards incorporating also the IMO’s SMCP, at three different levels: i) Elementary, Intermediate and Upper intermediate, ii) Officer- Deck and Engineering, and iii) Senior Officers – Deck and Engineering, also senior officers at port and pilots. The tests will be piloted in at least two partner countries (Turkey and the UK). The other partner countries such as Finland, Norway and Poland, with experience in developing and testing of maritime English, will be encouraged to pilot the tests in their own institutions (Ziarati et al, 2008).
Safety at Sea and Ports - Review of Accidents and Incidents

A number of studies conducted by various maritime organizations reported that more than 75% of accidents at sea worldwide are due to human and organisational errors (IMO, 1994). However, it was noted that the analysis of these reports is very difficult task as maritime accident reporting forms and practices are not standardised worldwide (European Commission, 2001). Lack of an standardised accident report system while raised some 8 Years year has not been addressed. There are also no clear boundaries between accidents and incidents (Ziarati, 2003).

The human failure can be due to several types of error but primarily can be subdivided into mistakes or slips on the one hand, and personal and organisational on the other.

There is substantial evidence to show that humans are most likely to make errors when they are fatigued or under stress. (Grabowski et al,1996). The fatigue or stress could be due to personal reasons or due to organisational culture. Whatever the cause, it is important to identify and classify it so that causes could be studied and properly addressed.

Grabowski et al (1996) suggests that more often, human error is embedded in organizational and 'societal' processes that ultimately result in error. Spafford (2006) states that the following can all cause the level of human error in organizations to increase and thus put the attainment of goals and objectives at risk:

- Increased Complexity
- Operating Under Tight Deadlines
- Human Fatigue
- Task Switching
- Insufficient Planning
- Insufficient Testing
- Lack of Change Management
- Development on Production Systems
- Functional Silos
- Inability to Criticize
- Lack of Communication
- Lack of Documentation
- Lack of Standards
- Lack of Shared Objectives
- Lack of Training
- Lack of Understanding Causality
- Lack of Control and Process
- Knowledge

He suggests that organisations must take a careful look at their culture and processes to understand and subsequently manage the level of human error being introduced. He argues that "if we want to help safeguard the organization and its goals, then it is essential to understand what causes human error levels to increase and correspondingly, what can be done to reduce those levels".

In the article published by the Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology (POST), (2001), the concept of Safety Culture is regarded as an important issue adding that the
management of the organization must also take responsibility for decisions which affect the 
safe functioning of the organization as a whole (Health and Safety Executive, 1999).

In a report (McCafferty - USCG, 2005) it is stated that:

- 45% of shipping accidents are primarily due to human error (i.e., humans initiated the 
chain of events leading to an accident).
- 35% of accidents are initiated by events or situations other than human error, but 
where humans failed to adequately respond to threats.
- 20% of accidents are due to external events or conditions, or mechanical failures that 
were appropriately attended to by the crew.

The above classification is rather implicit. For instance, it is interesting to note USCG sees 
human errors as primarily as those initiated by humans leading to accidents. Also, when 
humans fail to adequately respond to a threat this is not classified as a human error. 
Somehow, USCG ignores other factors such as design failures. In a paper by Ziarati (2006), 
the causes of error are identified as follows:

- incorrect use of navigational equipment
- competence (or lack of it) in English Language
- misinterpretation of maritime rules and regulations
- organizational factors – lack of training, disregard of factors such as manning levels, 
etc. which could lead to tiredness and hence lead to mistakes
- cultural factors
- linguistics

A review of accident/incident reports from some main investigation bodies, established to 
investigate accidents and incidents, clearly shows that it is not always easy to see the 
underlying reason for accidents and often these accidents and incidents are not very well 
classified (IMO MSC 2006).

James Reason (1990), explains that that there are three basic error types:

- skill-based slips (and lapses),
- rule based mistakes,
- and knowledge-based mistakes.

Skill-based failures are usually the result of inattention (monitoring); rule-based failures are the 
result of either the application of bad-rules or the misapplication of good-rules; and, 
knowledge-based failures are the result of the rational mind (reasoning), or incomplete or 
inaccurate information. The definition of skill-based failures is not clear. Skill-based failures 
are often associated with lack of skill, either resulted from the deficiencies in the initial training 
or absence of skills updating (SOS, 2005-07 – Ziarati, 2005)

There are other issues which need to be taken into consideration. The first one is that no ship 
is similar to another – unless it is a mass production- and there are no standards in terms of 
design - placement of equipments and rooms, and so forth - and this may cause several 
problems concerning safety since it is a habit for the crew to often change the ship they are 
working due to many issues viz., financial and residential issues. To this end, the new crew on 
board always need a period of adjustment to become familiar with the equipment and the 
layout of the new ship. But what if there is an emergency situation before this new seafarer 
gets used to the ship and if s/he has the key role in matters concerning the safety issues!
The above table was extracted from ATSB. There are similar tables produced by TSB, MAIB, and MINMod. The reason for showing the table is that causal factors due to communications have been reported in only 4 cases. A careful study of the reports clearly shows that in many cases the cause is actually due to language and communication problems. Most companies do not admit to self-criminating failures particularly taking responsibility for lack of competence in English Language when this has led to accidents. The following account of the major accidents at sea with substantial loss of life is one the examples given in this paper. A number of examples are presented at the end of the report in Appendix 2. all accidents are written in blue ink for copyright purposes to ensure all copies are obtained from the authors.

The Scandinavian Star disaster sets a good example as to how communication plays a major role or a contributory factor in causing an accident. The ferry was sailing from Oslo to Norway on 7th April 1990. The crew (99) was multinational and most of the passengers (383) were from Norway. Two fires broke out. The first one was quickly extinguished but the second one spread rapidly and went out of control. The result is 158 deaths.
Both the owner and the class of the ship were changed right before the accident and the ship was brought to service by the new owners before it was allegedly ready so the crew was not familiar with the ship. In addition to this fact, many Filipinos in the crew did not speak or understand Norwegian or English so they were not able to help the passengers to evacuate the ferry (Robinson, 1999).

After Scandinavian Star disaster two initiatives were initiated at IMO, viz:

- MSC/Circ 673: "On board Communications for Passenger Care" leading to the preparation of a corpus of English Phrases specific for passenger vessels.
- MSC/Circ 794: "IMO Standard Marine Communication Phrases" = (Scandinavian Star case is considered as the origin of the Standard Maritime Communication Phrases - SMCP)

“Although the fire was reported not to have been related to poor communications between officers and crew, the poor safety organization on board coupled with the inability of the officers to communicate with all of the crew and the inability of the crew to communicate with the passengers were noted to have exacerbated the loss of life” (Winbow, 2002).

In Appendix 2, there several examples of other cases where poor communication has play a role in causing accidents or its impact and effect.

In large-scale disasters, the ‘often-cited’ cause of human error is usually taken to be synonymous with ‘operator error’ but a measure of responsibility often lies with system designers (Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology (POST), 2001). It is also reported that ‘system design’ should be considered carefully since a good system should not allow people to make mistakes easily. The report also adds that commonly, system design is carried out in the absence of feedback from its potential users which increases the chance that the users will not be able to interact correctly with the system. System design here should not be divorced from Maritime language system. In fact the IMO SMCP is in a form of system design, albeit in need of further improvements which projects such as MarTEL are attempting to address.

Among all the above factors that have crucial impact on safety issues, the one regarding ‘high level of working language’ forms the main concern of this research as poor communication is considered to be one of the main causes for maritime accidents. It is pertinent to note that only in few publications communication failures or linguistic problems were classified at all or even if they were, they were not one of the main causes of the accidents.

The shortage of deck and marine engineer officers, in water transportation sector (Urkmez, 2005, Warwick Report - BIMCO/ISF, 2005), for example, is an undeniable fact and all concerned are aware that one way of overcoming this shortage is to recruit seafarers from other nationalities. Unfortunately when trying to solve the shortage problem by recruiting seafarers from other nationalities, ship owners and shipping companies often overlook the training issues, viz., that seafarers from different nationalities have received often different standard of training, particularly as far as Maritime English is concerned and also these seafarers bring with them cultural attributes that are unique to their origins which brings another dimension to the use and interpretation of the ‘Maritime Language’ onboard the vessels.

Ziarati (2005) applied Pareto Analysis in finding solutions to the problem areas in education and training of seafarers. Pareto Analysis is based on the proven principle that %20 of sources cause %80 percent of the problems. And a very important fact is that the shipping
industry could benefit immensely in that Pareto prevents shifting the problem where the solution removes some of the causes, but worsen others.

Ziarati (2005) in his paper Pareto Analysis, draws the attention that IMO’s priority in recent years has been to revise the crew standards – STCW but he argues that IMO cannot work alone therefore governments and related industries should show the same determination. He supports this argument through two studies, one by Torkel and the other one by the University of Technology and Science (NTNU⁶) in Norway. Torkel reports that 25% of the world fleet was responsible for more that 50% of shipping accidents around the world. The study notes that the top 25% of the safest ships were involved in just 7% of all accidents; and NTNU reports that by improving the quality of the world fleet to the same level as those in the safest 25% category, there might be an overall reduction of 72% in shipping accidents.

In a report by POST(2001) it is noted that human beings will always make mistakes because they have ‘limitations’; limitations in their attention, perception, memory, logical reasoning and so forth. It is suggested that a good system that is designed through the ‘feedback’ from its potential users will help people to make less mistakes. Therefore, in developing standards for Maritime English, it crucial to realise that communication failures do not just concern failures purely relating to competence in use of English language, but lapse of memory, perception and so forth, are part and parcel of it. In many accident reports it was found that due to lack of a uniform formatting system (standardisation) and lack of meaningful classification of causes of accidents and incidents, many causes relating to communications failures are attributed to other causes.

In the same report by POST, it is stated that standardisation is sometimes used as an attempt to make the situation ‘predictable’ and it is suggested, for example, that medicine profession is one of the areas most amenable to standardisation. It continues that resuscitation units in accident and emergency hospitals vary considerably in their design and operation and adds that this diversity coupled with the movement of staff between hospitals, mean that errors can be made and delays occur. It is concluded that if all hospital equipment had standard placement and design, then all staff would be able to locate and operate equipment with ease. But immediately after this statement, the attention is drawn to how costly it would be to re-implement standardisation across all departments of an industry. This fact can be regarded as a limitation in approaches to reducing human error in general and communication failures in particular. In medical practice, the standardisation of medical terms and these terms’ applications plays a major role in reducing communications errors to minimum.

In shipping SMCP has also served same purpose, however, SMCP only covers issues about ‘safety’, but not the issues that have ‘impact on safety’. There are no training methods to overcome pronunciation, reflect of cultural differences on the Maritime Language, organizational issues, comprehension and application of common terms and terminologies, and so forth. Therefore SMCP is in need of a major overhaul if a similar practice to the implemented in medical profession is to be applied in shipping operations. A reference to the Appendix 1 of this paper clearly shows there are two ‘number pronunciation’ systems used worldwide and this in itself is a cause for concern.

As mentioned earlier, there may be other types of communication problems that may not conveniently fit into communication failure category, namely, cultural, social, etc. For instance, Chinese seek perfection (Jin Yongxing,????). Jin Yongxing states that for a particular nation, some common characters can still be identified and categorized as “Typical Characters”. For instance, he talks about Chinese nation’s ‘pursuit of perfectness’. He supports this observation with the outcome of a survey conducted domestically to investigate the expectation of the parents of the students in middle and primary schools that helps to
show the tendency of most Chinese in seeking ‘perfectness’. With the question “What are your expectation from your child?” The survey indicates 71.3% of the parents answered “they should do everything as perfect as possible” and 9.67% of them said “they should do everything better and better.” That is to say, over 80% of the parents expected very high standards from their children. He continues and relates this outcome to Chinese communication problems in Maritime industry and suggests that during communication with others, efficiency would be reduced to some degree undoubtedly since Chinese seafarers are likely to pursuit ‘perfectness’ hence taking their time to think and organize good sentences as well as they may put themselves under pressure in making correct and prefect expressions.

One further issue is that in medical profession and indeed in airline industry assessment of knowledge, skills and understanding is based on criterion referencing. That is to say, all outcomes of a given unit of study, or training, needs to be developed, assessed and passed. The final assessment is fully competence based. This is not currently the mode of practice in most Maritime education institutions.

Conclusions

It is common sense that a great deal has and can be learnt from accidents and incidents. In fact all major maritime rules and conventions have emanated from major accidents at sea and in ports. The problem seems to be that different accident authorities use different formats to investigate and report accidents. For obvious reasons the owners also do their utmost not to shoulder any responsibilities for any accidents that may be used against them no matter what. Review of accident reports and technical papers clearly elucidates that there is no unified format for classifying the causes of accidents that could sensibly be used to classify communication failures and those that do, some do not consider the communication errors to be the main cause of many accidents or incidents.

However, the review of many accidents to date clearly shows that communication failures to be one of the main or contributory causes of accidents, and more importantly they can be avoided if those involved with developing and delivery English language training for merchant navy cadets and officers learn from the identified causes and support the development and implementation of standards such as those being developed by project such as MarTEL. Thus, MarTEL should be considered a positive development and a valuable contribution in improving safety at sea. Improved competence in English language would also help in improving communication among the crew and with others as well as creating a more amenable environment on board of vessels at sea.
APPENDIX 1 - INTERCO International code of Signals

N-NOVEMBER  A-ALFA
O-OSCAR     B-BRAVO
P-PAPA      C-CHARLIE
Q-QUEBEC    D-DELTA
R-ROMEO     E-ECHO
S-SIERRA    F-FOXTROT
T-TANGO     G-GOLF
U-UNIFORM   H-HOTEL
V-VICTOR    I-INDIA
W-WHISKY    J-JULIETT
X-X-RAY     K-KILO
Y-YANKEE    L-LIMA
Z-ZULU      M-MIKE
5-PENTAFIVE 0-NADAZERO
6-SOXSIX    1-UNAONE
7-SETSESEVEN 2-BISSTWO
8-OKEOIGHT  3-TERRAITHREE
9-NOVENEINE 4-KARTEFOUR

IMO SMCP Codes

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APPENDIX 2- Examples of Accidents where Communication Problems Are Classified as Main or Contributory Factors.

Example 1 - Short Video – Maritime English Training

Example 2

Ship A– “Vessel on my port bow, this is vessel on your starboard bow, with a CPA of 0.15 miles(sic) come in please.”

SHIP B – “Yes. What is your position?”

Ship A– “Second Mate”!

This was overheard on VHF Ch16 in the Malacca Straits.

(www.nautinst.org/mars/mars 02/200204.html (2008)

Example 3

Ship X was approaching a port and called VTS.

X – “VTS, VTS, VTS, this is ship X

VTS – “Ship X, ship X, Ship X, this is VTS, VTS, VTS. Please give me your present position.”

X - “I am on the bridge”!

(www.nautinst.org/mars/mars 02/200237.html (2008)

Unfortunately these are no jokes. They can make us burst into laughter but there is a serious message behind them. And we would not be laughing if say the second conversation took place in case of an emergency situation and this small and ‘funny’ misunderstanding/language deficiency cost loss of lives.

Example 4

Grounding of FINNREEL RoRo Cargo (IMO, 2005b) sets a very good example to support the argument for better communication on board vessels is essential.

On 14th of March 2001, the FINNREEL RoRo Cargo “while departing the port of Rauma, Finland, under pilotage in clear, calm and cold weather, the main engine oil mist detector alarm activated automatically for unknown reasons, shutting down the main engine. The vessel then sheered uncontrolled out of the main channel and subsequently grounded. The vessel sustained significant damage. The main cause of the accident was due to technical deficiencies and system design failures. But among the issues raised was ineffective communication, viz:

- Engine-room failed to clearly communicate the automatic engine shutdown situation to the Master.
- The Master understandably framed and focused on the thruster failure and was unable to clearly understand the entire loss of power situation due to time constraints and ineffective communication between the Master and engine-room staff of the automatic shutdown.”
In the two communication issues raised in the accident report it is not possible to identify whether the communication was ineffective due to language problems or due to other issues such as ignorance, lack of situation awareness, cultural factors, assumptions, etc. that have impact on communication failures.

Example 5

Another example, in terms of emphasizing how difficult it is to clearly identify the role of language deficiency in communication related accidents, can be the grounding/stranding of ‘City of Sunderland’ a vehicle carrier (IMO, 2005c). “On the evening of 1 January 2002 while under pilotage, in building very heavy weather and reduced visibility, the City of Sunderland’ failed in an attempt to berth as planned. Subsequently, the vessel departed port with a tug escort to return to safe anchorage grounds. While in transit the wind and sea state further deteriorated the conditions prompting the tug to be cast off. Shortly thereafter the vessel exited the channel and grounded, sustaining heavy hull damage although no pollution, injuries or deaths resulted.”

Among the causes of the grounding are:

“- Inadequate communications between the pilot station and the ship’s Master regarding the need to pre-order a tug assist for berthing.

- Inadequate communications between the Pilot and Master regarding vessel manoeuvring plans and movements.”

One of the issues raised after the incident was “Importance of Bridge Resource Management principals and voyage pre-planning, including emergency contingency plans, and communicating those plans to all crew members involved in the evolution.”

Why the plans were not communicated to all crew members’ was not conducted properly is a question mark again. Was the Maritime language level of the crew inadequate so they could not properly understand the plans? Or was it a communication break-down due to poor management?

Example 6

This is an incident took which place when a cargo ship was docking in Lerwick, Shetland Islands, UK, on 11 Nov 2002 and unfortunately led to death of a sailor.

The accident happened when the pilot on board the cargo ship was directing the assistance of two tugs in severe weather condition. Due to the breakdown of the communication the captain of the cargo either did not know, or did not understand the pilot’s instruction to make fast a tug forward. To this end, the captain did not consider delaying entry in the harbour, nor did the pilot or the harbour master consider suspending pilotage services or port entry. There are two communication related issues raised after the incident concerning human factor. The first one is the importance for port authorities to establish proper towage guidelines that include procedures for communicating between Port Control, the Pilot, the tugs and the ship. The second issue raised is that, the Port Control had used a conversational English to communicate with Master whose mother tongue is not English. It is reported that such communication could lead to ambiguity and is considered imprudent if not unsafe. It is important to note that the communication, e.g. between Port Control and a ship, should be clear and precise to avoid any possibility of misunderstanding.
Example 7

The Telegraph (2007) and also MAIB (2007) highlight the same problem in the identification of causes of accidents. In the Maersk Doha accident the cause of the accident was noted to be the auxiliary boiler failure leading to fire, but in fact if the accident report is carefully studied the cause could have been classified as communication failure. It was noted that all the officers apart from the chief engineer came from Eastern European countries and shared a common language and despite meeting the requirements for gaining UK Certificates of Equivalent Competency and being able to use the working language of the ship, there was a tendency for the majority of the crew to revert to their shared native language. This had the effect of isolating the chief engineer even in normal circumstances, hindered his ability to understand and control the response to the emergency.

It is apparent from the chief engineer’s actions throughout the accident that he had difficulty in understanding what was being reported to him and that language barriers hindered his command of the situation. He delay in engineering staff informing the bridge about the auxiliary boiler failure, and the lack of explanation given to the master, suggests limited interaction between deck and engineering departments. The master accepted the chief engineer’s report without further questioning. The subsequent increase in speed shows that either the chief engineer had failed to explain the implications of the breakdown, or the master had not understood its significance. Even though the chief engineer was concerned about the overheating, he allowed engine speed to increase in response to the master’s orders. Poor communication and understanding between the master and chief engineer placed the vessel at greater risk (MAIB, 2007).

What is significant about this incident is that although all relevant crew held appropriate qualifications in accordance with the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watch-keeping for Seafarers (STCW) with UK Certificates of Equivalent Competency (CECs) and that were continuously being evaluated by the master, superintendents, auditors and port captains, the question is ‘What went wrong?’

Nautilus UK raises the question, that reflects the concern in case of the above accidents, ‘Is the case of the Maersk Doha a sign of a relaxed attitude to standards?’ (Telegraph; Aug 2007).

Example 8

Extract from the presentation by Capt. Boray Koluksever at the TRANSAS Conference in Gothenberg in 2008:

“During the early hours of 14 December 2002, M/V Kariba, a Bahamian-flagged container ship, collided with M/V Tricolor, a 50,000 DWT Norwegian-flagged vehicle carrier travelling from Zeebrugge to Southampton. M/V Tricolor sank, with 2,871 new BMWs and Volvos, some 20 miles off the French coast in the Dover Channel. The very next night, a German Flag M/V Nicola struck the wreck. Vicky, a Turkish-registered fuel carrier, hit the same wreck again on 1 January 2003.

In addition to several inquiries a legal case was filed against the owner of the Vicky for a multi-million dollar compensation accusing the Vicky’s Captain of negligent and the French navy alleging that Vicky did not heed its warning of ‘Wreck Ahead’ and continued on its route and collided with the partly salvaged sunken ship, Tricolor.”
TUDEV, using its TRANSAS 4000 simulator, developed a case exonerating Vicky’s Turkish owner of any negligence and wrong-doing.

The presentation is followed by a video of the incident.

Example 9

There is a story about a US Fleet seeing a red light being observed on its pass in the Persian Gulf and immediately see the red light sending a message that this is the US Fleet and right of way is expected. The respond to the message was that you are on the collision course please alter your course. The Admiral of the Fleet, somehow nonplused and rather enraged, repeats its request again uttering the reply that this the US Fleet on an official exercise and right of way is demanded immediately. The respond to this latter outcry was as follows: Admiral your Fleet is heading for the lighthouse and if you do not change your course you will…. The collision of the US Fleet recently with a US Submarine in the Persian Gulf was apparently due to a communication error – Details not in hand as yet.

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